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MURKY WATERS: SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA COMPELS ARBITRATION
ALTHOUGH THERE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A CONTRACT
By
Michael C. Barbarula*
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Schultzes hired the Olshan Foundation Repair Company of Mobile

(“Olshan”) to perform foundation work on their house three different times.1 When
the work was not performed to the Shultzes liking, they sued and Olshan sought to
compel arbitration.2 The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Schultzes did not
present enough evidence to show that the 2008 work was not performed pursuant
to the 2007 contract; it therefore granted the motion to compel arbitration.3
II.

BACKGROUND
Florence and Arnold Schultz own a home in Washington County,

Alabama, and hired Olshan to perform work on their house.4 Olshan performed
work on the foundation of the Schultz’s home on three separate occasions: August
2006, March 2007, and January 2008.5 In July 2008, the Schultzes sued Olshan,
alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence and wantonness.6 The
Schultzes alleged that Olshan performed the repair work negligently, resulting in
damage to their house; that the value of their home decreased as a result; and that
the Schultzes suffered emotional distress caused by the negligent home repair.7
*
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1
Olshan Found. Repair Co. of Mobile, L.P. v. Schultz, 2010 WL 4034866, *1 (Ala. 2010)
[hereinafter Olshan].
2
Id.
3
Id. at *8.
4
Id. at *1.
5
Id.
6
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *1.
7
Id.
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Olshan responded to the complaint by filing a motion to compel
arbitration.8 After completing some discovery to determine whether the
controversy should proceed through arbitration, the trial court made certain factual
determinations that the Supreme Court of Alabama accepted.9
The parties agreed that the work performed in August 2006 was completed
pursuant to a contract signed by Mr. Schultz; however, neither party was able to
produce the contract.10 Olshan produced a contract that it claimed normally was
used when performing residential foundation repair work, the type of work done in
this matter.11 This document contained a clause stipulating that “any dispute,
controversy, or lawsuit between any of the parties to this agreement about any
matter arising out of this agreement” would be submitted to binding arbitration
using the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).12 The Schultzes claimed
that the condition of their home worsened after the work performed by Olshan in
2006.13
In March 2007, the Schultzes rehired Olshan to perform similar repair
work to the foundation of their home; this time, Olshan produced a copy of the
contract dated March 2, 2007 to install nine “CableLock Plus Pilings,” which came
with a lifetime warranty.14 The contract provided further that “the owner may order
extra work to be done, not contemplated by this Agreement, in which event a
separate Agreement for such work shall be entered into between [Mr. Schultz] and
[Olshan]. No oral representation made by anyone can change or modify this
agreement.”15 In addition, this contract contained an arbitration submission
provision identical to that of the first contract.16 Instead of inserting nine pilings,

8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *1.
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Id.
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Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at *2.
16
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *2.
9
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however, Olshan actually installed twelve; Olshan’s general manager stated that it
was typical for his company to agree to install a certain number of pilings, but
install more if the job so required.17 Again, Mr. Schultz stated that the work
performed in 2007 worsened the condition of his home; this time, he did not pay
Olshan.18
In January 2008, Olshan performed more work on the foundation of the
Schultzes’ home.19 This work was done without a contract, but Olshan produced a
letter stating that the company’s intention in performing this work was to “satisfy
our agreement so your warranty will be instigated and we can get paid.”20 For a
third time, Mr. Schultz said that the condition of his home worsened after Olshan’s
repairs.21 He sued Olshan on July 28, 2008, and after Olshan’s motion to compel
arbitration, the Schultzes amended their complaint to add claims by Mrs. Shultz
only for negligence and wantonness.22 The trial court rendered its opinion on
January 22, 2010. It denied the claims of Mrs. Schultz as being without merit,
granted the motion to compel arbitration as to the work performed pursuant to the
March 2, 2007 contract, but denied the motion to compel arbitration as to any work
performed in 2006 and 2008.23
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3.
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Id.
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Id.
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ANALYSIS24
The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the denial of the motion to

compel arbitration de novo.25 In this case, Olshan had the burden of proving a
contract existed that contained a reference to arbitration and that was involved in
interstate commerce.26 If Olshan could make this showing, then the burden shifted
to the Schultzes to prove that the arbitration agreement was either invalid or did
not apply to the controversy.27
Olshan argued that the district court erred in denying its motion to compel
arbitration on the 2008 work because it was done as follow-up work to the 2007
contract, which contained an arbitration agreement.28 Olshan cited Elizabeth
Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato to support his argument.29 The Cato court stated that all
doubts about the arbitration provision should be decided in favor of arbitration,
“[when] the problem at hand is in the construction of the contract language
itself.”30 Therefore, the motion to compel arbitration should not be denied unless
one can positively say that the arbitration provision did not cover the particular
dispute that spawned the litigation.31 Elizabeth Homes argued that the work
performed in their case was done as a result of a warranty provision in the original
24

The Analysis section does not discuss any of the work performed in 2006 as Mr. Schultz
admitted that the contract he signed in 2006 contained a reference to arbitration. Id. at *4.
In addition, the Court found that Mrs. Schultz’s claims were subject to the 2006 and 2007
contracts and were arbitrable. Id. at *12.
25
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3; see Parkway Dodge v. Yarbrough, 779 So.2d 1205
(Ala. 2000).
26
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3; see TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So.2d 1110,
1114 (Ala. 1999).
27
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3; see Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So.2d 313,
315 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So.2d 277, 280 (Ala.
2000)).
28
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *5.
29
Id. at *5; see Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2007) [hereinafter
“Cato”].
30
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *5; see Cato, 968 So.2d at 7 (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)) (emphasis added).
31
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *5; see United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); and Cato, 968 So.2d at 7.
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agreement, and as such the work was part of the original agreement.32 The
Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with Elizabeth Homes, and held that the
homeowners failed to meet the burden of showing the arbitration provision did not
apply to the work performed.33
Analogizing the case at bar to Cato, Olshan pointed to the 2007 agreement
that provided a lifetime warranty for Olshan’s work, and argued that the 2008 work
was done as “follow-up.”34 The Court found that the work done was either
performed as a warranty on the 2007 contract or to complete the 2007 contract;
therefore, Olshan met its burden and it would be up to the Schultzes to show that
the arbitration provision did not apply.35
Mr. Schultz argued that the language in the 2007 contract was not broad
enough to encompass the work performed in 2008.36 The contract provided that if
the owner wanted extra work to be done, the parties should enter into a separate
agreement.37 Mr. Shultz used the reasoning in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Jordan decision to support his proposition.38 In that case, the
arbitration clause applied to “all controversies which may arise between
us…whether entered into prior [to], on, or subsequent to the date hereof,” and the
court found it broad enough to apply to “any and all controversies…regardless of
the kind of controversy or the date on which the controversy occurred.”39 While
the Court agreed that the Merrill Lynch agreement was broader than the agreement
in this case, the Court did not believe that the 2007 agreement was too narrow as to
not apply to the work done in 2008.40 The Court believed that Mr. Schultz did not
32

Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *6; see Cato, 968 So.2d at 10.
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *6; see Cato, 968 So.2d at 10-11.
34
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *6.
35
Id. at *7.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jordan, 719 So.2d 201 (Ala.
1998) [hereinafter “Merrill Lynch”].
39
Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *7 (quoting Merrill Lynch, 719 So.2d at 202-04).
40
Id. at *8.
33
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present any evidence that the 2008 work was not done in furtherance of the 2007
contract.41 Therefore, the Court cannot say definitely that the work done was not in
furtherance of the 2007 contract and the lower court erred in denying the motion to
compel arbitration.42
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE
This is a case that should be the poster-child for bad arbitration

agreements. Olshan took nearly two-and-a-half years to work its way through the
courts before being compelled to arbitration. A lot of time and money were wasted
on determining whether there was an agreement to arbitrate over the 2008 work;
only now can the case proceed through arbitration and a final decision can be
rendered. One has to wonder if this was even worth it to the Schultzes. They could
have spent more on legal fees than they could possibly recover in damages to their
home. For Olshan and businesses that work pursuant to contracts, this case is an
example of how not to write an arbitration agreement. The courts usually uphold
broad arbitration agreements, yet it certainly cannot be said definitively whether
Olshan’s contract applied to future work. Since arbitration is supposed to be a
speedy, efficient, and cheaper route to the resolution of disputes, those who draft
arbitration clauses should take note of the time invested in this case as a reminder
to make the clauses as broad as possible.
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Id.
Id.

